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In conventional quantum key distribution protocols, the secure key is normally extracted from the
measurement outcomes of the system. Here, a different approach is proposed, where the secure key
is extracted from the measurement bases, rather than outcomes. Compared to the original Bennett-
Brassard-1984 protocol, the proposed protocol involves no hardware change but modifications in
data postprocessing. We show that this protocol is more robust against detector efficiency attacks
and photon-number-splitting attacks when practical detectors and photon sources are used.
Since early civilizations, every advance in encryption
has been defeated by advances in hacking, often with se-
vere consequences. Quantum cryptography [1, 2] holds
the promise to end the hacking-defending battle by offer-
ing unconditional security [3–5] when ideal single-photon
sources and detectors are employed. In practice, ideal
devices never exist, and detection loopholes and source
imperfections have become the targets of various attacks
[6–8].
The detection efficiency loophole is first discovered in
the context of nonlocality tests, such as Bell’s inequality
test [9], which are designed to disprove the theory of local
hidden variables. The loophole allows local hidden vari-
ables to reproduce the prediction of the quantum theory
when the detector efficiency is low enough [10]. Non-
locality test leads to an important concept in quantum
mechanics — entanglement, which has been shown to be
the precondition for the security of a quantum key distri-
bution (QKD) system [11]. Intuitively, one would expect
the efficiency loophole may introduce security issues for
QKD. In fact, such suspicion has been proven true by
quantum hacking [7]. Various approaches have been pro-
posed to close this loophole [12, 13].
One way to close the loopholes introduced by the
device imperfections is to implement the fully device-
independent quantum key distribution (DIQKD) pro-
tocol [12, 14]. However, such protocol is a challenge
for practical implementation due to its high require-
ment on physics devices. So far, no DIQKD experi-
ment has been demonstrated even under a lab condition.
Recently, Lo, Curty and Qi proposed a novel scheme,
measurement-device-independent quantum key distribu-
tion (MDIQKD), to close all loopholes existing in the
measurement devices [15]. However, it requires coinci-
dent detections and interference of two independent pho-
ton sources, which make the experiment realization chal-
lenging [16–18]. Also, the security of the MDIQKD pro-
tocol relies on trustful implementation of source encod-
ing.
On the source side, the loophole exists in imperfect
single photon sources, which inevitably emit multi pho-
ton states. From the study of photon-number-splitting
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(PNS) attacks [6, 19], multi photon states would cause se-
vere security issues for QKD. Such problem can be solved
by introducing decoy states in the system [20–22]. Note
that the decoy-state method is applied to MDIQKD pro-
tocol [15].
In this work, we propose a QKD protocol that is
not only able to close the detection efficiency loophole,
but also make the system more robust against imper-
fect source attacks. Compared to the current QKD re-
alizations, the protocol involves no hardware change but
modifications in data postprocessing. Thus, it offers im-
mediate applications in quantum cryptography.
The protocol, between two legitimate users Alice and
Bob, runs as follows.
1. Alice randomly prepares one of the four BB84
states, |0〉x, |1〉x, |0〉z, or |1〉z, and sends the state
to Bob.
2. Upon receiving the state, Bob randomly chooses
the X or Z basis for measurement.
3. Alice and Bob record their raw key bits according
to the basis they have chosen. Alice sets her key bit
to be 0 for the two states in the Z basis, |0〉z and
|1〉z, and 1 for the two states in the X basis, |0〉x
and |1〉x. Bob sets his key bit to be 0 for theX basis
measurement and 1 for the Z basis measurement.
4. Bob publicly announces the measurement out-
comes, 0 (for |0〉x or |0〉z) or 1 (for |1〉x or |1〉z),
but keeps his basis information confidential.
5. Alice and Bob performs raw key sift: they discard
the key when Bob’s measurement outcome matches
Alice’s state. For example, if Alice sends out a
state, |0〉x or |0〉z, and Bob announces 0, they will
discard the raw key bit.
6. They perform error correction and privacy amplifi-
cation on the sifted key bits to extract a final secure
key.
One can see that the first two steps form the quantum
phase of the proposed protocol, which is exactly the same
as the regular BB84 protocol. Thus, there is no hardware
change required to implement the new protocol. Note
that in Step 4, the measurement outcome announcement
2can also be done by Alice. The definition of bit 0 and 1
are different by Alice and Bob. It is not hard to see that
the raw key sift factor is 1/4, comparing to 1/2 in the
case of the original BB84.
Let us first compare the underlying assumptions in
the MDIQKD protocol and the new protocol. In the
MDIQKD protocol, the whole measurement device is as-
sumed to be in the hand of an adversary, Eve, who might
not actually perform the measurement as designed or
honestly announce the true outcomes. Here in the new
protocol, Bob still trusts the measurement device such
as the basis control. Eve can manipulate the measure-
ment results by controlling the detector efficiencies, such
as the time-shift attack [7], but she can only control the
detectors in a basis independent manner. That is, the
detectors respond the same to the two bases. Since the
final measurement outcomes are publicly announced, Eve
can also learn the detection results, but not the basis in-
formation. The new protocol still suffers from the basis-
dependent attacks, such as the strong pulse attack [23]
and the strong illumination attack [8]. From this point
of view, the MDIQKD protocol requires less assumption
on detection devices than the new protocol.
On the source side, due to the PNS attacks [6, 19], the
2-photon state is not secure for the MDIQKD protocol.
Later, we will show that this is not the case for the new
protocol. Thus, the new protocol is more robust against
source attacks than the MDIQKD protocol.
From the practical point of view, a MDIQKD system
requires coincident detection, while the hardware part of
the new protocol is the same as the regular BB84 proto-
col. Thus, the new protocol is more practical than the
MDIQKD protocol. We can put all these pros and cons
for the new protocol and the MDIQKD protocol, along
with the current QKD realizations and the fully device-
independent one (DIQKD)[12], in Fig. 1, from where one
can see that the new protocol enjoy the both side of the
worlds: security and practicality.
FIG. 1. Comparison of four QKD protocols in two aspects:
security and practicality. N: current QKD realization; ⋆: the
new QKD protocol; : MDIQKD; : DIQKD.
Now, let us take a look at how the proposed protocol
is secure against the known attacks. We will leave the
full security proof in future works.
In an intercept-and-resend attack, Eve measures the
state randomly in the X or Z basis and sends qubits to
Bob according her measurement outcomes. Without loss
TABLE I. Alice sends out state |0〉
z
(corresponding to a key
bit 0). Eve performs a simple intercept-and-resend attack.
From left to right, Eve randomly chooses a measurement basis
MEve = X or Z. Then she resends her measurement result
to Bob. Bob randomly chooses two bases, X (bit 0) or Z (bit
1) for measure. Obviously, when Eve chooses the same basis
as Alice, she will not introduce any disturbance.
MEve resend MBob outcome result disturbance
Z |0〉
z
- - - none
X |0〉
x
X |0〉
x
inconclusive none
Z |0〉
z
inconclusive none
Z |1〉
z
1 error!
|1〉
x
X |1〉
x
0 none
Z |0〉
z
inconclusive none
Z |1〉
z
1 error!
of generality, we assume Alice sends out state |0〉z in the
Z basis, corresponding to a key bit value of 0. The result
is shown in Table I. One can see that like BB84, Eve will
not introduce any disturbance when she chooses the same
basis as Alice, but she has 50% chance to introduce an
error when she picks up the wrong basis. Thus, the new
protocol is secure against the simple intercept-and-resend
attack.
By going through the rest three cases, where Alice
sends |1〉z, |0〉x, and |1〉x, one can see that if Eve chooses
the same basis as Alice or Bob, she would not introduce
any disturbance. If Alice and Bob choose the same bases
and Eve chooses the other basis, she would introduce an
error when the result is conclusive.
As shown in Table I, when Eve chooses the same basis
as Alice, the raw key sift factor is 1/4 as discussed previ-
ously. When Eve chooses the different basis as Alice, the
raw key sift factor becomes 1/2, in which case there is
50% error rate. Thus, the total error rate introduced by
Eve if she performs the simple intercept-and-resend at-
tack will be 1/3, which is different from 1/4 as the regular
BB84 protocol.
We assume Bob uses two detectors to distinguish two
states, |0〉 and |1〉, after the measurement basis is set. In
the efficiency control attack, we assume Eve has a full
control of the detector efficiency after the basis is set
(basis independent). That is, she can make detectors for
|0〉 and |1〉 active (100% efficiency) and inactive (0% effi-
ciency). This is the extreme case of the time-shift attack
[7]. Since the detection results are announced publicly
and also the detector respond the same to different basis
choices, such attack is ineffective.
In the PNS attack, Eve splits the 2-photon state, and
stores one photon in her memory and sends the rest to
Bob. After Alice and Bob compare the measurement out-
comes, Eve would measure her photon. If Eve chooses
the same basis as Alice, she would not get a conclusive
result. If she chooses the same basis as Bob, she has a
50% chance to get a conclusive result. Thus, Eve’s in-
formation about the key is not full. Note that for higher
3number Fock states, such as 3-photon state, the protocol
is not secure due to the unambiguous state discrimination
(USD) attack [24]. This is similar to the SARG04 proto-
col [25]. The key difference is that the SARG04 protocol
extract key information from the measurement outcomes,
which makes it suffers from the detector efficiency mis-
match attacks. While in the proposed protocol, the key
is extracted from the measurement basis, which makes it
robust against detector efficiency mismatch attacks.
In practice, due to detector efficiency mismatch or de-
tector dead time, the raw data from a QKD system nor-
mally cannot pass the statistical randomness tests. With
the proposed protocol, since its key information comes
from the measurement basis choice, the raw data can
easily pass the randomness tests.
This protocol can be proven to be secure, following
the security proof [26] of the SARG04 protocol which
uses non-orthogonal states to represent bits “0” and “1”.
In fact, the protocol proposed here may also be regarded
as such, using two sets of non-orthogonal states instead
of four in SARG04. To prove the security, we form an
equivalent entanglement-distillation protocol for the cur-
rent QKD protocol by capturing the QKD operations in
a joint state of Alice and Bob. To do this neatly, we
construct a filtering operation to be performed by Bob.
This operation converts non-orthogonal states to orthog-
onal ones and can be shown to be equivalent to Bob’s
USD measurement. We can then use this joint state of
Alice and Bob to determine the desired security relation,
which is obtained by projecting this joint state onto the
Bell basis. The outcomes give a relation between the bit
and phase error probabilities (denoted as eb and ep re-
spectively). In the experiment, we can estimate the bit
error rate directly, and from this relation we can upper
bound the phase error rate as well. Finally, we can choose
a quantum error correcting code tolerable to these two
error rates following Shor-Preskill’s proof [5] and derive
a secret key. The related work is in progress.
In summary, we have presented a QKD protocol that
is robust against detection efficiency loophole and PNS
attacks. Compare to the current BB84 realizations, the
proposed protocol do not involve any hardware changes.
This scheme can be directly applied to current practical
QKD systems, with modifications in the data postpro-
cessing procedure. The security of the protocol lies on
the assumption that the detectors behave independently
of Bob’s basis choice. Combining with the decoy-state
method, the proposed method would offer a practical so-
lution to the secure information exchange in practice. We
remark that this technique used in the proposed QKD
protocol may also be applicable to non-locality tests.
After completing this manuscript, we notice a few re-
lated works are put on online pre-print [27–30].
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